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 Chapter 1 
 Public Health Ethics: Global Cases, Practice, 
and Context 
 Leonard  W.  Ortmann ,  Drue  H.  Barrett ,  Carla  Saenz ,  Ruth  Gaare  Bernheim , 
 Angus  Dawson ,  Jo  A.  Valentine , and  Andreas  Reis 
1.1  Introduction 
 Introducing  public health ethics poses two special challenges. First, it is a relatively 
new fi eld that combines public health and  practical ethics . Its unfamiliarity requires 
considerable explanation, yet its scope and emergent qualities make delineation dif-
fi cult. Moreover, while the early development of public health ethics occurred in a 
Western context, its reach, like public health itself, has become global. A second 
challenge, then, is to articulate an approach specifi c enough to provide clear 
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4guidance yet suffi ciently fl exible and encompassing to adapt to global contexts. 
Broadly speaking, public health ethics helps guide practical decisions affecting 
 population or  community health based on scientifi c evidence and in accordance 
with accepted  values and  standards of right and wrong. In these ways, public health 
ethics builds on its  parent disciplines of public health and ethics. This dual inheri-
tance plays out in the defi nition the U.S.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) offers of public health ethics: “A systematic process to clarify,  prioritize , and 
justify possible courses of public health action based on ethical  principles , values 
and beliefs of  stakeholders , and scientifi c and other  information ” (CDC  2011 ). 
Public health ethics shares with other fi elds of practical and professional ethics both 
the general theories of ethics and a common store of ethical principles,  values , and 
beliefs. It differs from these other fi elds largely in the nature of challenges that pub-
lic health offi cials typically encounter and in the ethical frameworks it employs to 
address these challenges. Frameworks provide methodical approaches or proce-
dures that tailor general ethical theories,  principles , values, and beliefs to the spe-
cifi c ethical challenges that arise in a particular fi eld. Although no framework is 
defi nitive, many are useful, and some are especially effective in particular contexts. 
This chapter will conclude by setting forth a straightforward, stepwise  ethics frame-
work that provides a tool for analyzing the cases in this volume and, more impor-
tantly, one that public health practitioners have found useful in a range of contexts. 
For a public health practitioner, knowing how to employ an ethics framework to 
address a range of ethical challenges in public health—a know-how that depends on 
practice—is the ultimate take-home message. 
 We learn new things more readily when we can relate them to familiar things, 
and we understand complex things by breaking them into their components. 
Accordingly, throughout this introductory chapter, we will relate public health eth-
ics to more familiar concepts and better-known related fi elds, while the immediately 
following section will explore the components of public health ethics that derive 
from its  parent disciplines of public health and ethics. After describing public 
health’s core activities, goals, and  values , we will explain why ethical concepts like 
the  right to health ,  social justice , and health  equity directly follow as central con-
cerns of public health. After defi ning ethics broadly in everyday terms, we will 
examine the complementary roles facts and values play in public health. This exam-
ination is important because the respective bases of the two parent disciplines differ 
considerably; public health science rests on the logic of scientifi c discovery, whereas 
ethics rests on the logic of right action and good decision making. We will then 
contrast the more familiar, everyday understanding of  morality with the formal dis-
cipline of ethics as a prelude to considering three well-known ethical theories rele-
vant to public health. Because both  laws and ethical rules establish parameters for 
public health practice, their similarity and difference need to be clarifi ed. This 
extended account, fi rst of  parent disciplines, then of kindred concepts, and fi nally of 
family resemblances between the related fi elds of  clinical ethics ,  bioethics , and 
 research ethics , will culminate in an effort to characterize what is distinctive about 
public health ethics. 
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51.2  Public Health 
 There are many defi nitions of public health. They often begin as descriptions of cur-
rent practice but once established become prescriptions for subsequent practice. It 
is important, then, to consider defi nitions, because they shape not only public health 
practice, but also how we conceive of public health ethics (Dawson and Verweij 
 2007 ). The same logic applies to how we think about the individual concepts of 
health and the public. Defi ning health as the absence of disease or symptoms, for 
example, more readily fi ts allopathic medicine, which focuses on negating symp-
toms to treat disease. But it hardly fi ts public health’s emphasis on preventive mea-
sures that address root causes rather than symptoms. Nor does it cover public 
health’s promotion of health and well-being across a range of interventions. In this 
regard, the  World Health Organization (WHO) offers  a  defi nition of health more 
suitable to public health: “A state of complete physical, mental, and social well- 
being and not merely the absence of disease or infi rmity” (WHO  2006 ). But even 
this more holistic defi nition does not suffi ciently clarify the meaning of “public” in 
public health. Dawson and Verweij ( 2007 ) identify two primary meanings of “pub-
lic” in public health, each of which they break down into three senses. Public can 
mean population-wide and refer to (1) the epidemiologically measured health of a 
 population or group, (2) the distribution of health in a population, or (3) the underly-
ing social and environmental conditions impacting everyone’s health. Public also 
can mean collectively accomplished and requiring (1) the concerted actions of many 
people and institutions whether governmental or nongovernmental; (2) the coopera-
tion or involvement of the public, or (3) the public’s joint  participation to realize the 
health improvement. 
 In a practical fi eld like public health,  defi nition  often takes the form of enumerat-
ing key activities, such as  surveillance ,  sanitation , maintaining food and workplace 
 safety , disease  prevention and  control , and promoting healthy behavior. The identi-
fi cation of the ten essential services of public health illustrates this enumerative 
approach (Fig.  1.1 ) (Public Health Functions Steering Committee  1994 ). These ser-
vices fall under three overarching functions of assessment, policy development, and 
assurance that constitute an integrated cyclic process. The delivery of these services 
in local, regional, or national public health agencies accordingly defi nes public 
health practice. In this schema,  research is a distinct practical service but also 
 integral to all public health activities, providing insights and innovative solutions at 
every point. Public health ethics addresses the entire spectrum of ethical issues that 
arise in any area of public health practice but especially in those areas where no 
specifi c  guidelines govern practice.
 Such lists have the advantage of concretely specifying current activities but lack 
criteria that defi nitions normally provide for including or excluding additional activ-
ities as a fi eld develops. In 1920, Charles Edward A. Winslow, an infl uential public 
health theorist and leader, pioneered  a  defi nition of public health that still informs 
many European and international public health institutions, including WHO (Marks 
et al.  2011 ).
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6 Public health is the science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting 
physical health and  effi ciency through organized community efforts … and the  development 
of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the community a  standard 
of living adequate for the maintenance of health (Winslow  1920 ). 
 Even more succinctly, the  U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) defi nes public health 
as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be 
healthy” (IOM  1988 ). 
 These two defi nitions highlight the importance of collective action to address the 
health needs of  populations . Public health’s population focus distinguishes it from 
clinical medicine’s focus on individual patients, though examples like  vaccination 
indicate that the two fi elds can overlap. Epidemiologists statistically aggregate the 
health data of individuals to provide a picture of  population health , but populations 
ultimately originate from  communities of individuals who constitute social wholes. 
 Fig. 1.1  Essential Public Health  Services . (1) Monitor health status to identify  community health 
problems. (2) Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community. (3) 
Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues. (4) Mobilize community partnerships 
and action to identify and solve health problems. (5) Develop policies and plans that support indi-
vidual and community health efforts. (6) Enforce  laws and  regulations that protect health and 
ensure  safety . (7) Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of health 
care when otherwise unavailable. (8) Assure competent public and personal health care workforce. 
(9) Evaluate  effectiveness , accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based health ser-
vices. (10) Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems (From Public 
Health Functions Steering Committee  1994 .  Essential Public Health Services . Available at  http://
www.cdc.gov/nphpsp/essentialServices.html ) 
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7Individuals in society stand in complex relations of  interdependence , competition, 
and  solidarity that can impact health in ways that transcend the individual. Thus, in 
addition to aggregating individual medical data, epidemiologists need to measure 
the impact of various social factors on health. To tackle the complex, often compet-
ing health needs of social groups, public health practitioners need to dialogue and 
partner with their communities. At a higher administrative level, public health offi -
cials need to manage  intersectoral  collaborations , navigate political processes, and 
formulate public health law. Four distinguishing features of public health practice—
the pursuit of the collective good, a focus on  prevention , the use of  government or 
collective action, and an emphasis on an outcome-based (utilitarian) approach—
generate most of the ethical challenges public health practitioners typically face 
(Faden and Shebaya  2010 ). 
1.2.1  Core  Values 
 People value many things such as friends and family, material goods and resources, 
knowledge, and art. Some things people value are ethical virtues like courage or 
honesty, whereas others are ethical  principles like  justice and equality. People gen-
erally value what they consider important, what matters to them, and what gives 
their lives meaning. Public health’s primary goals and commitments refl ect its core 
values, which are rooted in health, science, and the community (Public Health 
Leadership Society  2002 ).  Everyone recognizes the value of health, but public 
health approaches health in relation to science and the community in its endeavor to 
prevent disease and injury, protect the public from harm, and promote health and 
well-being. But seeing how science and community represent values requires a 
word of explanation. 
 The commitment to science as a value stance often becomes apparent only in 
relation to people who distrust science or  prioritize other value commitments such 
as economic interests or religion. Public health values science by endeavoring to 
base interventions and policies on the best available data and evidence-based prac-
tices. That endeavor entails a commitment to conduct  surveillance and  research , 
because only by understanding the social burden of disease and its underlying or 
structural causes can public health impact the health of the entire  population . The 
qualifi er “best available” is a reminder of the need to continuously improve practice 
and not rely on tradition or current practices. It also reminds us that during emergen-
cies, time and resource constraints limit the ability to gather evidence. 
 Public health  values community in two obvious senses. First, it recognizes that 
the success of most  health interventions depends on a community’s acceptance, 
cooperation, or  participation . Second, it recognizes that to be successful, public 
health must  respect the community’s values and gain the  trust of its members. Yet 
there is a third, deeper sense in which community represents a value. A community 
is, to emphasize again, neither a statistical abstraction nor a mere aggregate of indi-
viduals but rather a network of relationships and emotional bonds between people 
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8sharing a life in common organized through a  political and moral order (Jennings 
 2007 ). The value that best refl ects this fundamental, relational character of social 
life is  solidarity .  Solidarity can remain unspoken yet operative because it forms the 
basis of social life and collective action. Just as communities are not mere aggre-
gates of individuals, neither are the agencies or organizations that make the collec-
tive decisions that affect the community. Personal interests, to be sure, can motivate 
individuals, but the felt recognition of a common plight, that we are all in it together, 
underlies the collective decisions society and public health must make to solve col-
lective problems. To say that public health values community means that it values 
solidarity, even when solidarity remains unacknowledged as is often the case 
(Dawson and Jennings  2012 ). 
1.2.2  Health  Equity , Social Justice,  and Social Determinants 
of Health 
 As the foregoing goals, defi nitions, core  values , and commitments of public health 
clearly suggest, the  right to health and health equity are central, not peripheral, to 
public health’s mission. Chapter  8 on  international collaboration will examine some 
practical challenges in addressing the right to health and social determinants of 
health, so the emphasis here will be on the rationale for achieving health equity as a 
matter of social justice. 
 Despite greater individual access to health care and advances in public health, 
high burdens of disease remain across much of the globe. Some differences in  dis-
ease burden result from genetics and some from variable  risks of exposure to infec-
tious agents and other threats, but most of the differential burden arises from social, 
economic, and political  conditions . These conditions include poverty, lack of educa-
tion, and  discrimination against particular social groups and often refl ect historical 
injustices or long-standing systemic, structural defi ciencies. Collectively, these con-
ditions have come to be known as  social determinants of health (Blane  1999 ). 
Greater access to individual health care can mitigate their effect, but an adequate 
response to them requires concerted public action to address their underlying causes. 
 Whether comparing countries or groups within countries, social stratifi cation by 
 social determinants correlates with differences in health status (Marmot  2007 ). 
These health differences have aroused widespread concern, but how one defi nes 
them signifi cantly affects public health practice (Braveman  2006 ). In particular, dis-
tinguishing  health disparity from health in equity is critical. As a comparative indi-
cator of health status, health disparity is a neutral, epidemiologic term that need not 
imply an ethical  obligation to remedy. Health  disparities , however, can and fre-
quently do refl ect underlying inequities. WHO defi nes  health inequities as health 
differences that are “socially produced; systematic in their distribution across the 
 population ; and unfair” (WHO  2007 ). Terms like “inequity” and “unfair” are ethical 
terms that imply an obligation to redress an in justice. Justice has a range of mean-
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9ings that include giving people what they deserve or are owed and distributing 
goods and services fairly. Justice in a medical context often involves the individual’s 
access to health services. In public health, discussions of health  equity usually 
involve questions of how to distribute health benefi ts fairly or how to achieve better 
 health outcomes among communities or groups that suffer  health inequities . 
Attaining greater  equity might involve the politically controversial strategy of dis-
proportionally distributing resources within a  population , by, for example, distribut-
ing more to those most in need.  A less-controversial strategy is to improve  health 
outcomes for all, even while devoting special efforts to those most in need. WHO 
defi nes  health equity as “the absence of unfair and avoidable or remediable differ-
ences in health among population groups defi ned socially, economically, demo-
graphically, or geographically” (WHO  2007 ). 
 Achieving health  equity is most urgent for groups who have experienced histo-
ries of marginalization and  discrimination and who continue to experience higher 
rates of illness and premature deaths than members of the mainstream  population . 
Especially for these groups, “social injustice is killing people on a grand scale” 
(WHO  2008 ). Realizing the goal of social justice with  respect to health means 
achieving health equity. Doing so requires not only a fair distribution of  health out-
comes , it also means that “ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain 
their full health potential” and that “no one should be disadvantaged from achieving 
this potential, if it can be avoided” (Whitehead  1992 ). For many, these goals imply 
that social justice obligates public health to improve any social condition that pre-
vents people from maintaining a  standard of life adequate to maintain health (Powers 
and Faden  2006 ). Although some believe that improving  social conditions that 
affect health overextends public health’s mandate, such a broad mandate is arguably 
consistent with both Winslow’s and IOM’s defi nitions of public health. Moreover, 
such a broad mandate has both nineteenth century precursors in the social medicine 
movement and more recent  precedents in the “Health for All” strategy that empha-
sizes  health promotion and the “Health in All Policies” strategy (Kickbusch  2003 ; 
Freiler et al.  2013 ). But a major milestone was reached with the 2008 report of the 
WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health that sought to “marshal the 
evidence on what can be done to promote health  equity , and to foster a global move-
ment to achieve it” (WHO  2008 ).  Although  governments can guarantee  human 
rights and essential services, establish policies that provide an equitable basis for 
health improvement, and gather and monitor data on  health equity , achieving equity 
ultimately will depend  on the cooperation of government and civil society (Blas 
et al.  2008 ). 
1.3  Ethics 
 People strive to be “good,” to do the “right” thing and to lead a “good life,” but where 
do such basic, familiar moral  values as good and right originate? Throughout his-
tory, religious people have explained these ideas as revelations of divine command. 
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Anthropologists, however, view morals as customs that govern social interactions, 
and because all cultures display such customs, interpret moral practices in terms of 
a survival function rooted in human nature. By contrast, many social and  political 
thinkers emphasize that moral concepts result from social conventions or agree-
ments that are subject to deliberation and change.  Governments today often consult 
social scientists and health experts who empirically investigate what fosters or 
improves human life, health, and happiness. Where science informs  law and  policy , 
it helps defi ne in a conventional sense what we mean by good and right. In particu-
lar, public health science helps establish what is considered good for the health of 
 populations and communities. Further below we will examine three ethical theories 
prominent in public health ethics that offer contrasting perspectives on the nature 
and basis of  morality . In the meantime, we will address three general questions that 
a public health practitioner fi rst approaching the study of ethics might well ask: how 
does science relate to ethics, what is the difference between ethics and  mora lity, and 
what sort of things count as  principles or basic concepts in ethics? 
1.3.1  Scientifi c Facts and Ethical  Values 
 Public health practice increasingly requires appreciation of the complementary 
roles facts and values play in making and justifying decisions. Observation reveals 
facts, while scientifi c research controls and manipulates the experimental context to 
discover causation or correlation. Data on  disease burden , research on intervention 
 effectiveness , and estimates of the resultant health benefi ts for the  population gener-
ally inform public  health interventions . Health messaging can often inform the pub-
lic about the scientifi c rationale underlying public health interventions. Nevertheless, 
in the mind of the public, scientifi c evidence does not always invalidate or outweigh 
other sources of evidence or appeals to emotions, interests, and values. While public 
health practitioners give more weight to  community health and scientifi c evidence, 
they also need to consider how the public will respond to an intervention. 
Successfully implementing public health actions, then, will often entail weighing 
the public’s attitudes, interests, and values in relation to public health’s core 
values. 
 Two mundane features of public health practice often serve to conceal value 
assumptions: shared core values and  standard practice. First, sharing values can 
render them invisible as assumptions, until they unexpectedly become contested. 
Unwelcome surprises occur when interventions that presuppose core  values affect 
 stakeholders who do not share those values, as when  parents refuse to have  children 
vaccinated based on media hearsay or individuals reject a highly effective program 
as governmental intrusion. Avoiding such surprises begins with becoming aware of 
one’s own value presuppositions in relation to those of other stakeholders and com-
munity members. Second, routine use of evidence-based standards can conceal 
underlying value assumptions. If developed and tested to address a known health 
problem, as is common, an intervention’s purpose and effectiveness is taken for 
L.W. Ortmann et al.
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granted. Standard interventions, then, generally require no more justifi cation than 
noting their standard status or seeing that “the facts dictated” their use. “Dictating” 
facts are indicators that trigger use of a standard intervention (e.g., meeting the cri-
teria of a case defi nition or documenting exposure to a dangerous level of a contami-
nant). Such “dictating facts,” more properly speaking, only  indicate the appropriate 
intervention but cannot literally  dictate that anything be done. What in the end dic-
tate actions are the values, goals, and  obligations that the standard intervention pre-
supposes and that practitioners tacitly ratify each time they apply the standard. In 
other words, values, goals, and  obligations , even when tacit, form a necessary bridge 
between knowledge and action. 
 Though  standard practices tacitly incorporate ethical  principles , they seldom 
raise ethical challenges. Challenges more typically arise in unusual or extreme situ-
ations where standards are not yet in place, are changing, or are competing. These 
situations include emergency operations, foreign cultural settings, emergent fi elds 
with innovative interventions, or periods of severe budget constraints that force pri-
oritization of programs. In such challenging situations where no value consensus 
exists or where evidence does not point to a single course of action, public health 
ethics provides a process to determine and justify a course of action. That justifi ca-
tion can incorporate a number of factors: evidence base for the intervention, 
 cost effectiveness , analysis of relevant ethical rules and  stakeholder  values , a cre-
ative design of options or alternatives that embody these values, and a fair and trans-
parent  decision-making process that incorporates stakeholder contributions. 
 Recognizing one’s own value assumptions in relation to those of the public will 
be critical for implementing new interventions wherever success depends on public 
acceptance. The public will not embrace interventions that embody or presuppose 
values that clash with community values or whose relative importance is low com-
pared to other community values. Members of the public generally are more com-
mitted to their  political views, ethical and religious values, and an intervention’s 
impact on them personally than to scientifi c evidence or community impact. Public 
health practitioners need to recognize that no matter how compelling to them, com-
munity impact and scientifi c rationale seldom resonate as deeply with the public. 
Consequently, in communicating, public health practitioners need to supplement 
scientifi c messaging with dialogue, an appeal to common values, or enlistment of 
spokespersons who share the value orientation of the relevant  stakeholder s or com-
munity. Regarding some controversial matters, ultimate success in implementing an 
intervention may require building a  social consensus (Ortmann and Iskander  2013 ). 
 In certain situations, untangling factual claims based on science from value judg-
ments is critical for success. For example, suppose independent investigators have 
scientifi cally verifi ed the level of worker exposure to a toxic chemical used in indus-
try. Determining what level of exposure would be safe, however, remains a value 
judgment that depends on the degree of concern that people have about  safety . 
Placing a higher value on safety might result in stricter controls that decrease  risk 
for workers, but the fi nancial  costs of decreasing risks could cut industry profi ts or 
jobs, even as health costs fall.  Stakeholders representing industry, workers, or public 
health practitioners might have different positions regarding a safe level of  exposure. 
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To make a good decision about a safe exposure level, the value of safety might have 
to be discussed and weighed in relation to business, employment, and health consid-
erations. However, these varying positions regarding safety need not imply disre-
gard for safety or disagreement on the underlying facts. Rather, they illustrate that 
confl icting value judgments can coexist despite a consensus on both the underlying 
facts and the importance of a particular value such as  safety . 
 Directly addressing the value  confl icts in such situations through ethical delib-
eration makes more sense than calling into question the underlying facts and can 
lead to better, fairer, and more transparent decisions. It is also important to recog-
nize that doubting the science often represents an underlying value dispute mas-
querading as a scientifi c dispute (Brunk et al.  1991 ). Sowing doubt on scientifi c 
assessments merely as a tactic to oppose an evidence-based  policy or recommenda-
tion undermines science. This doubt can exert pressure to test and retest results, 
raising the bar for scientifi c validity ever higher (Michaels  2008 ). The solution is 
not to litigate, as it were, the science, but to recognize that communicating  risk is a 
social process that goes beyond science messaging and must take cultural attitudes, 
perceptions, and symbolic meanings into account (Krimsky and Plough  1988 ). 
Where profound value disagreements prevail, public health legitimately  prioritizes 
its core  values but cannot speak for everyone.  Stakeholder views require a fair hear-
ing, whether through media  research , stakeholder analysis, or direct solicitation of 
input from individuals, focus groups, or public meetings. By design, a fair, transpar-
ent ethical decision-making procedure can help determine what value tradeoffs are 
feasible and what values may be nonnegotiable. Such a deliberative procedure can 
help to gain public acceptance and become part of the justifi cation for a course of 
action. 
 To those accustomed to rigorous research methods and evidence-based  standards 
of practice, navigating the world of ethical values and rules can be perplexing. 
Values, as the term itself implies, manifest valences, that is, variable degrees of 
commitment or estimations of importance along a continuum. Individuals rank  val-
ues differently, change their rankings, and will alter their relative ranking of values 
in different contexts. The range of options for ethical rules are far more limited, 
namely, to obey or not obey. Nevertheless, the ethical rules governing particular 
situations also vary from country to country or even from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
within a country. Despite this variability in values and ethical rules, reducing ethical 
judgment to mere opinion or to a consensus of opinion relative only to personal or 
cultural preferences would be a mistake. Ethical values and rules enjoy the approval 
of history, custom,  law , and religious tradition, but they also fi nd anchor biologi-
cally, psychologically, and socially in human life. Value judgments and ethical 
determinations, then, are not relative as much as correlative; that is, they correlate 
and resonate with these deeper roots of human life that we share. If humans indeed 
share a set of fundamental values, then ethical  confl icts primarily refl ect differences 
in prioritizing  values in a particular context, rather than a fundamental disagreement 
about values. This point of view provides grounds for optimism about the possibil-
ity of fi nding a deeper basis for understanding and mutual  respect , if not agreement, 
when ethical tensions surface. 
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1.3.2  Ethics  and  Morality 
 Although many use the terms ethics and morality interchangeably, we will distin-
guish the formal discipline of ethics from the common morality that guides every-
day actions and behavior. Morality refers to a society’s shared, stable beliefs about 
what is good and bad, right and wrong. Through upbringing and socialization, each 
generation passes this common morality to the next. Common morality envelopes 
the individual like an ecosphere of shared customs, rules, and  values . For most cir-
cumstances, people habitually rely on this common morality to guide their conduct, 
and it serves them well, just as  standard practice generally serves  professional prac-
titioners well. Still, common morality can fall short where its rules  confl ict , where 
it inadequately illuminates novel moral problems, or where intense disagreement 
prevails among rival  stakeholder s. In such instances, the formal discipline of ethics 
offers a deliberate, systematic way of addressing troubling moral issues,  confl icts , 
and  dilemmas . Ethics can assist in:
•  Recognizing ethical issues and distinguishing them from factual issues; 
•  Providing a vocabulary to systematically discuss ethics; 
•  Identifying appropriate ethical  principles to guide action in a particular context; 
•  Using these principles to analyze actions in regard to their ethical acceptability; 
•  Understanding the competing moral claims and  values of  stakeholders ; 
•  Designing alternative courses of action that incorporate these claims and 
values; 
•  Evaluating which alternative best fi ts a given context, all things considered 
•  Establishing a procedurally just, transparent process for decision making; and 
•  Justifying decisions regarding recommendations, policies,  or  intervention s. 
1.3.3  Ethical  Principles 
 Principles are general categories, rules, or  guidelines that form the basis of a disci-
pline. In ethics, there are various kinds of principles and many examples of each 
kind. The kinds include basic ethical categories (e.g., virtues,  values , or rights), ethi-
cal commands or rules of conduct (e.g., not stealing, not harming, or treating others 
with  respect ), and  guidelines for weighing outcomes (e.g., achieving the greatest 
good for the greatest number, distributing burdens and benefi ts fairly, or properly 
proportioning benefi t to harm). Ethical principles like  justice or respect for  auton-
omy are simultaneously values, ideals, and the basis for deriving rules of conduct. 
Such rules serve as  ethical standards to evaluate past and pending actions, programs, 
and policy  recommendations . When addressing complex or controversial issues or 
issues involving numerous  stakeholders , many different principles can come into 
play. But because ethical decision making depends on context (e.g., on local circum-
stances, community stakeholders, and decision makers), no formula can determine 
the most relevant ethical principles. Nevertheless, most ethicists and practitioners 
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working in a fi eld would agree that certain principles, theories, or frameworks pro-
vide more helpful guidance for that fi eld. Given the need for fl exibility, some prefer 
to speak not of ethical principles but of “general moral considerations” that can 
provide guidance in public health practice (Childress et al.  2002 ). At any rate, a 
complex ethical challenge involving stakeholders with competing moral claims fre-
quently demands consideration of a variety of ethical  principles and theories to 
address the situation and justify a proposed intervention. For these reasons, it will 
be useful both to examine below several ethical theories used in public health ethics 
and to provide at the end of the chapter a framework that is generally applicable to 
ethical issues that arise in public health. 
1.3.4  Ethical Theories 
 As used here, an ethical framework refers to a tool or approach for practically 
addressing ethical challenges that often includes a stepwise procedure. An ethical 
framework may rely heavily on just one ethical theory, but frameworks generally 
take a pragmatic approach that procedurally allows for using a variety of theories or 
principles as the issue or context demands. Whereas an ethical framework has a 
practical orientation, an ethical theory also addresses more fundamental questions, 
so-called “metaethical” questions. Does  morality originate in divine command, 
human nature, or human convention? Is it essentially a habit, intuition, form of rea-
soning, or a quality or purpose of an action? An ethical theory will offer a distinct, 
coherent understanding of the source and nature  of  morality that will shape how one 
reasons about moral issues and determine which  principles are most important. Two 
persons employing the same theory, however, will not necessarily reach the same 
conclusion about an ethical issue; much will depend on which aspects of the issue 
they deem most important and on how they weigh different factors. Nevertheless, 
because a particular ethical theory tends to favor certain principles or types of prin-
ciples, using the same theoretical approach will lead to similar lines of reasoning 
and selection of  principles . 
 The  diversity of ethical theories does not imply their mutual opposition so much 
as points to the extensive range of the moral landscape and the need to illuminate its 
various contours. A helpful way of illuminating this landscape is to distinguish 
theories depending on whether they focus on the actor, the action, or the results of 
action. To illustrate this particular way of carving up the moral landscape, Table  1.1 
describes some well-known ethical theories.
 Aristotle’s virtue ethics is an ethical theory that focuses on the moral character of 
the actor or agent (Bartlett and Collins  2011 ). Classic virtues are dispositions or 
stable patterns of behavior that lie between extremes of vice; courage, for example, 
lies between the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness in taking risks. Habit and 
practice are necessary to develop virtues whose possession we equate with good 
character and that equip a person to be effective in society or an organization. 
Because good character translates into virtuous action that others aspire to emulate, 
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we tacitly invoke virtue ethics whenever we ask how an outstanding public fi gure or 
health leader would handle a situation. In a modern  professional context, virtues 
also include the skills the profession has identifi ed that lead to success in that pro-
fession and which professional education and training instill in practitioners. Once 
established, virtues readily become the  standards of  obligation and  accountability to 
evaluate professional performance and function similarly to the rules and  principles 
of  duty discussed below. Holding public health institutions accountable for the pro-
fessional competence of their employees illustrates virtue ethics (Public Health 
leadership Society  2002 ). More recently,  th e capabilities approach has exploited the 
potential of virtue ethics to guide decisions about  policy or interventions in a way 
that goes beyond matters of professional training and responsibilities. This approach 
takes a broader developmental view of human agency and capacity building. It con-
ceives health as a fundamental capability necessary for individuals to succeed in 
society, one on which many further capabilities depend (Sen  2009 ; Ruger  2010 ). 
 An ethical theory that focuses on action or, more properly, the rules governing 
action, is deontology. The word deontology comes from the ancient Greek word, 
 deontos , which means duty. Because duties oblige us to obey rules that govern 
actions or conduct, they bind or constrain the will ahead of action. In judging 
whether an action is right or wrong, deontology ignores consideration of harmful or 
benefi cial consequences and relies on these rules of  duty to serve as the  standard of 
judgment. People usually have rules of duty or  obligation in mind when they speak 
of  ethical standards or worry that standards are breaking down. Examples of these 
rules include religious commandments to honor  parents , not lie, or not steal and 
 Table 1.1  Ethical theories 
 Theory  Agent-centered  Deontology  Utilitarianism 
 Focus  Agent  Action  Result of action 
 Key fi gure  Aristotle  Immanuel Kant  John  Stuart Mill 
 Main 
concept 
 Virtues : Acquired habits, 
skills, or dispositions that 
make people effective in 
social or professional 
settings 
 Duties : Ethical rules or 
commands that constrain 
one’s action or defi ne 
 obligations owed to 
others 
 Results : Good or bad 
outcomes of actions and 
policies or their 
benefi cial or harmful 
effects on individuals 
and society 




 Ethical and religious 
commandments, 
obligations to seek justice 
or respect persons and 
their rights 
 Burdens, risks, harms, 
or  costs versus the 
benefi ts, advantages, or 
savings resulting from 
interventions or policies 
 Ethical 
action 
 Doing what a virtuous 
person would do in a 
given situation 
 Fulfi lling an obligation or 
 duty owed to oneself or 
society 
 Maximizing the net 
balance of benefi ts over 
harms 
 Uses  Assessing skills and 
capacities needed for 
success in a community, 
organization, or 
profession 
 Establishing  compliance 
rules and regulations, and 
setting standards for 
evaluating actions and 
behavior 
 Conducting population- 
level cost-benefi t, 
risk-benefi t, or 
 cost-effectiveness 
analyses 
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rules of social interaction such as treating people fairly, doing them no harm, or 
respecting their rights. Rights often are said to stand in reciprocal relation to duties. 
Thus, the right to free speech presupposes a duty to  respect the right of others to 
speak or the public health  obligation to ensure conditions for maintaining health 
presupposes a  right to health . 
 Deontology as a theory owes most to  Im manuel Kant’s view of the “good will” 
and his closely linked account of  autonomy . A person of morally good will does the 
right thing for its own sake, which means acting purely for the sake of duty.  Duties 
are moral rules or  laws that bind the will and limit the scope of action. For Kant, 
basing decision for one’s action solely on duty without regard to the potential good 
or bad consequences of the action is the only legitimate basis for moral action. Kant 
even goes so far as to say that “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and 
the same” (Gregor et al.  2012 ). 
 Kant conceives duty as the quintessential expression of  autonomy , which may 
come as a surprise to those who equate autonomy with rational free choice or even 
just following one’s preferences without interference. However, the meaning of 
autonomy for Kant derives from its literal meaning in Greek,  autos (self) and  nomos 
( law) ; namely, self-legislating. Autonomy enacts from within the moral rules and 
 principles that bind the will and guide action. However, not every self-originating 
impulse should be obeyed; only actions conceivable as universal laws morally bind 
the will. Morally laying down the law for oneself entails legislating for everyone, 
but universally legislating does not mean asserting one’s will over others. Nor does 
it mean that the ethical content of a moral law or duty is valid eternally and every-
where. Rather, it refers to the “categorical imperative” an unconditional require-
ment for an action to be moral. To qualify as a duty, a rule that commands action 
must apply to every rational person. Stealing, for example, could never qualify as a 
 duty , because a situation where everyone steals from everyone else would undercut 
the one-sided advantage of stealing that the thief hopes to exploit. Although self- 
directed, autonomous action is necessarily other-regarding. 
 Kant maintains that the categorical imperative can be expressed in two other 
ways equivalent to universality, namely, “respect for humanity” and a “kingdom of 
ends” (Gregor et al.  2012 ). In each, this other-regarding dimension of autonomy is 
evident. Respecting humanity means never treating persons as mere means or 
objects but always treating them as ends, that is, regarding them as fellow autono-
mous agents. Autonomously agreeing on actions, interventions, or policies requires 
that decision makers mutually consider and understand their reasons for action and 
be willing to abide by the rules derived from these reasons as  laws they collectively 
impose upon themselves (O’Neill  2002 ). 
 The idea of a fellowship of mutual consideration comes out most clearly in 
Kant’s concept of a kingdom of ends. This concept is really the ideal of a systematic 
union or commonwealth of autonomous individuals making  law s that apply to 
everyone. This ideal presupposes that ethical deliberation places  respect for others 
as ends, as autonomous agents, above self-interest. The core idea is that we only 
consider actions that could gain acceptance by a community in which all see them-
selves as sovereigns who lay down universal laws binding on themselves and others. 
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The hope is that the body of  law governing society progressively embodies this 
ideal. Such mutual regard in laying down the moral laws that will bind one’s actions 
differs signifi cantly from insistence on noninterference with individual free choice, 
let alone with personal preferences. Conversely, the aspiration behind Kant’s view 
of  autonomy harmonizes well with the public health  obligation to address collective 
problems through collective action. 
 For  utilitarianism , judging the rightness of an action depends on an estimation of 
its subsequent practical outcome or result rather than on its conformity to  principles 
of  duty . Utilitarianism considers ethically best that course of action that will result 
in the greatest  net benefi ts over harms. A utilitarian approach underlies cost-benefi t 
analyses that weigh an intervention’s  costs ( risks , harms, burdens, or disadvantages) 
against its benefi ts (advantages, utility, improvements, cost savings). In addition to 
its focus on consequences, utilitarianism is egalitarian, communitarian, and scien-
tifi c in outlook. It is egalitarian in considering everyone’s benefi t and equally 
weighting each person’s good, as opposed to privileging certain people. It is com-
munitarian in attempting to increase benefi ts to society rather than individuals, 
seeking the “greatest good for the greatest number.” It endeavors to be scientifi c by 
quantifying harms and benefi ts, accounting for probability, and calculating net ben-
efi t. Calculating net benefi ts over harms is less problematic when relevant factors 
employ a common scale of measurement, for example, weighing the fi nancial costs 
of treating a disease with the cost savings from preventing that disease. Comparing 
different outcomes (e.g., fi nancial costs versus quality-adjusted life  years ) some-
times involves diffi cult judgments about the relative value of each outcome. Because 
the utilitarian approach seeks to determine and promote the collective good based 
on aggregate measures, it readily lends itself to justifying public  health 
interventions . 
1.3.5  Law Versus Ethics 
 Laws share certain deontological features with ethical  principles of action (and with 
religious commandments). They all defi ne one’s  obligations or  duties and typically 
take the form of rules or commands regarding what one should or should not do. 
They can lay down positive requirements to fulfi ll but more commonly establish 
parameters that prohibit certain actions or constrain  liberty in some way. Laws do 
not differ from ethical rules primarily based on content, because an ethical rule can 
become a law without changing the rule’s content. For Kant, at least, the crucial 
difference between ethics and law concerns one’s reason for obeying; namely, 
whether one acts purely voluntarily out of a sense of  duty or merely in external 
conformity with duty, either to appear to be moral or out of fear of penalty or pun-
ishment. Laws are rules enforced by penalty or punishment, which many people 
might otherwise break. Society can tolerate the fl outing of some rules, but disobedi-
ence of more important rules can disrupt society or create danger. For these reasons, 
society establishes and enforces laws regarding socially important matters, not 
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leaving their  compliance up to individual prerogative. An ethical rule’s enactment as 
law, therefore, implies agreement by society or the law’s enactors on the importance 
of strictly regulating the behavior the law governs. Law can be a blunt instrument 
that effectively compels compliance, which suffi ces to satisfy the reasons for its 
enactment, even if it cannot coax  voluntary obedience from an inward sense of duty. 
 In theory, deontologically evaluating a past or proposed action is a straightfor-
ward binary determination of compliance or noncompliance with a legal or ethical 
rule. In practice, however, defi ning a rule’s scope or determining exactly which 
actions fall under it can prove diffi cult. Moreover, when different rules apply, deter-
mining which should take precedence often becomes problematic, especially when 
they  confl ict . Lying to protect a relative, for example, can put the  duty to speak 
truthfully into confl ict with familial  obligations . Determining which rule takes pre-
cedence can involve reasoning clearly from ethical  principles , weighing the under-
lying  values embodied in the  law , or considering the practical impact of the 
intervention in context. Because laws demand  compliance , they are more rigid. 
Additional legal stipulations can  prioritize or specify how to apply laws in certain 
situations, but doing so increases their complexity. Ethical  guidelines operate more 
fl exibly than rigid, compulsory laws and more readily accommodate compromise. 
With ethical guidelines, decision makers can consider and rank the underlying val-
ues the ethical rules serve to promote. Doing so allows for trade-offs between com-
peting ethical considerations and for deciding which values it makes sense to 
prioritize in the given context. Conversely, law’s comparative rigidity can be a virtue 
where only stricter oversight and  enforcement will ensure compliance and establish 
order. 
 Across cultures, legal, ethical, and religious rules prohibiting basic offenses such 
as lying, theft and murder show considerable overlap. However, cultures vary in 
exactly which rules are matters of individual choice and which are matters of legal 
enforcement and punishment. This variability also applies to the status of rules and 
standards governing  research on human subjects. Even within a country, signifi cant 
variability can prevail in whether human subjects’ research rules and  standards are 
legal  regulations or ethical  guidelines (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services  2015 ). Some  se e the lack of legal regulation as a breach in protections, but 
others prefer guidelines, arguing that regulations tie reviewer hands, making it more 
diffi cult to make trade-offs or nuanced judgments based on moral discernment of 
the particulars of each case (Verweij and Dawson  2009 ). Because each approach 
offers advantages and disadvantages,  political culture and local context must ulti-
mately decide whether human subjects’ research rules exist as enforceable regula-
tions or ethical  guidelines . 
 Regardless of whether it takes the form of guidelines or  law ,  research ethics will 
govern only a fraction of the ethical issues that the fi eld of public health must 
address. In many areas of public health practice, there are no specifi c ethical  guide-
lines or  regulations . To address ethical challenges in these areas or to address emer-
gent challenges, the ethical practice of public health therefore requires the ability to 
use general ethical frameworks. Such frameworks can employ checklists of ques-
tions and stepwise procedures. However, because novel challenges continually 
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emerge and changing contexts introduce nuances no set of rules can anticipate, pub-
lic health  professionals ultimately need to practice ethical decision making over 
time in order to cultivate moral judgment and discernment. 
 By laying down and enforcing what may, must, or cannot be done, legal rules 
function as boundaries of acceptable behavior. Ethics, science, budgets or politics, 
each in its own way, also can restrict the scope of action. Public health practitioners 
and offi cials therefore fi rst need to conduct a feasibility analysis to determine the 
relevant limits on possible interventions or policies. Determining these limits sel-
dom will restrict the scope of action to a single possible course. Given multiple 
possibilities, most people will aspire to the best course of action beyond the legal 
fl oor of minimally acceptable behavior yet within the other relevant limits. As a 
result, the ethical challenges public health practitioners face seldom involve stark 
choices between right or wrong, good or evil. A good feasibility analysis will have 
ruled out any unethical or illegal options or alternative courses of action in advance. 
Rather, the tough choices more frequently involve selecting the best alternative 
from among competing goods, each of which to a greater or lesser degree realizes 
the public health goal and embodies relevant  stakeholder values. 
 Whereas determining and complying with the various limits on action is largely an 
analytic process, designing alternatives is a synthetic, creative process. Alternatives 
should all realize the public health goal and incorporate the perspectives and  values 
of subject matter experts and relevant stakeholders. Deciding upon the best alterna-
tive must take into account how it will realize the public health goal in a particular 
context and with  respect to the stakeholders. For example, advocating contraceptives 
to reduce unwanted teen  pregnancy might seem to promise success based on effi -
cacy studies, but ethical controversy could render such a program less than optimal 
in some contexts.  Political culture  or  social  norms can confer partisan advantage or 
disadvantage to some alternatives, while other alternatives may enjoy an advantage 
because of the experience and expertise of a health department. Whatever alterna-
tive practitioners fi nally choose, their choice will presuppose a prioritizing of val-
ues. The foregoing account highlights why public health practitioners need to see 
ethics as something more than a  compliance matter. It transcends compliance 
because public health ethics also involves practical decision making, which should 
include stakeholder analysis, the incorporation of stakeholder values in the design 
of alternatives, and a fair, transparent deliberative process to evaluate alternatives. 
1.4  Public Health Ethics 
 Compared with more established fi elds of  practical ethics such as  clinical ethics , 
 research ethics , and  bioethics , the fi eld of public health ethics is relatively new. 
Consequently, many public health practitioners may be better acquainted with these 
more established fi elds than with public health ethics. In particular, practitioners 
may already be acquainted with the four  principles these fi elds rely on for ethical 
evaluation:  benefi cence ,  nonmalefi cence ,  respect for  persons ( autonomy ), and 
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 justice (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare  1979 ; Beauchamp and 
Childress  2012 ). Being applicable to health and  research , these four principles also 
are relevant to public health, but having arisen to address issues in other fi elds, they 
need to be adapted to a public health context. Even then, they still fall short in 
addressing the ethical challenges that arise in public health. Examining these related 
ethics fi elds and showing how the four principles fi t into a public health context can 
serve by way of contrast to indicate what is distinctive about public health ethics. 
1.4.1  Research Ethics , Clinical Ethics, and  Bioethics : 
 Principlism and the Four  Principles 
 Research ethics  entails the wider notion of scientifi c integrity but is best known and 
most developed in relation to medical research involving human subjects. The 
development of human subjects’ research ethics  guidelines can neither be divorced 
from breaches of ethical conduct in human subjects’ research nor wholly reduced to 
a reaction to these events. But beginning with the  Nuremberg Code ( 1947 ), balanc-
ing  risks and benefi ts to research subjects and getting their  informed consent have 
been cornerstones of international  research ethics guidelines. Far more infl uential 
than the  Nuremberg Code , the  Declaration of Helsinki from the World Medical 
Association (WMA) is a fundamental document in international human subjects’ 
research ethics  guidelines . Its initial 1964 version included provisions for proxy 
 consent for those with diminished  autonomy . Its 1975 revision called for review of 
 research by an independent committee, now known as an  ethics review committee 
(WMA  1964 , 1975, 2013). The use of such committees began spreading under the 
aegis of WHO and then in response to the  HIV/AIDS pandemic, as the number of 
large-scale  vaccine and  drug trials grew in developing countries. In the  United 
States , research  regulations set forth in the  Common Rule govern  ethics 
review committees as well as all human subjects’  research that receives U.S. 
government funding (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  2009 ). In  the 
 United States, a standing ethics review committee generally functions within a 
specifi c governmental or university institution and therefore is referred to as  an 
 institutional review board (IRB). Beginning in 1982, the  Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) , in  collaboration with WHO, proposed 
 i nternational ethical  guidelines for  biomedical research involving human subjects 
(CIOMS  2002 ). 
 Our discussion of these documents has only highlighted key provisions of what 
is required to ensure the safety of human subjects. CIOMS’s most recent research 
 guidelines ( 2002 ), for example, contain more than 60 pages of text, explanation, and 
commentary. But ensuring ethical conduct and scientifi c integrity in  research 
requires more than the oversight function of  ethical review committees. It also 
requires extensive training not only in  research ethics but also in a number of related 
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areas. Training and guidelines should cover, among other things, mentoring of 
junior researchers, authorship and publications  policy ,  confl icts of  interest that arise 
in partnerships and collaborative science, and data acquisition, management, shar-
ing and ownership. Ethics training can help develop moral judgment. The hope is 
that training and application will enable practitioners to reason about new, diffi cult, 
or ambiguous cases in morally discerning ways. 
 Clinical ethics address the ethical issues that arise in clinical practice. Until the 
advent of  bioethics , medical professionalism emphasized the health care provider’s 
 obligation to  prioritize the patient’s welfare, the health care provider’s professional 
judgment about what would most benefi t the patient, and the importance of estab-
lishing patient  trust . The traditional model of  clinical ethics was frankly  paternalis-
tic . Under the infl uence of bioethics, many health care providers began embracing a 
more patient-centered model of care that emphasized patient  autonomy and 
 informed consent . This patient-centered model conceives care as a contract between 
patient and provider. The emphasis on contracts strikes some as an inappropriate 
consumerist model that undervalues  professional judgment and undermines patient 
trust in the medical profession. Tensions between these two models have led to a 
compromise that reasserts the importance of medical professionalism and clinical 
judgment, while acknowledging the importance of respecting patient autonomy 
(ABIM Foundation et al.  2002 ). 
 Bioethics has a range of meanings, the fi rst of which applies to ethical issues 
brought about by advances in biomedicine and  biotechnology . Ethical issues that 
arise from using life-sustaining technologies in end-of-life and beginning-of-life 
care  epitomize  this sense of bioethics. But bioethics also arose in response to medi-
cal  paternalism and to the abuse of human subjects in medical  research . Bioethics 
has championed  informed consent , patient autonomy in doctor-patient relationships 
and the  safety of human subjects in research. However, many bioethicists think the 
focus on  clinical ethics and on  personal autonomy unduly restricts bioethics’ pur-
view. They advocate a more holistic,  social justice approach in bioethics, which has 
been referred to as “population-based bioethics” or “integrative bioethics” (Sodeke 
 2012 ). It can be argued that this expansion of bioethics beyond  clinical ethics into 
population issues moves bioethics into the arena of public health ethics (Callahan 
and Jennings  2002 ). 
 Principlism came into being in a 1979 document called the  Belmont Report 
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare  1979 ). The report was the work 
of the U.S. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral  Research , which convened in 1974 partly in response to 
the exposé of the  U.S. Public Health Service Tuskegee  Syphilis Study. The  Belmont 
Report became the basis for revising 45 CFR 46, the so-called  Common Rule , part 
of the legally binding U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, governing the protection of 
human subjects (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  2009 ). The 
 Belmont Report clearly explained the underlying ethical  principles that informed 
existing  regulations and provided an ethical framework for thinking about subse-
quent regulations. Principlism has remained the predominant ethical framework in 
biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress  2012 ). Its explanatory groundwork 
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accounts for much of its success, but its relevance to medicine and  research , the 
prestige that attaches to these fi elds, and its compatibility with liberal  individualism 
also have played a role. 
 Benefi cence (doing good) and  nonmalefi cence (doing no harm) date back to the 
Hippocratic Oath as medical principles. Collapsing them both into benefi cence, as 
the  Belmont Report does, underscores the practical consideration that  biomedical 
decisions generally aim to optimize  net benefi t over harm, rather than to maximize 
only benefi ts or minimize only harms or  risks . However, these  principles are dis-
tinct, not mere opposites. Not doing harm has a certain priority (fi rst, do no harm), 
because not benefi tting someone seems a less serious offense than doing that person 
harm. That priority partly refl ects the human tendency more readily to forgive over-
looked benefi ts (errors of omission) than deliberate actions resulting in harm (errors 
of commission). 
 Justice has several meanings that include due process and fair deliberative proce-
dure, properly assessing what people are owed or due, and equitable distribution of 
burdens and benefi ts. According to philosophic tradition, justice has always func-
tioned dually, applying to individuals but more importantly serving as an overarch-
ing principle for adjudicating competing claims in relation to the group or to other 
members of society. The phrase, “ social justice ,” then, is redundant but in  political 
contexts marked by  individualism serves as a reminder of justice’s social dimen-
sion. In fact, this phrase came into vogue in public health circles to counter the 
ideology of “market justice,” which views the equal access of individuals to the free 
market as a valid, reliable, and preferred means for sorting out issues of economic 
and social justice (Beauchamp  1976 ). The notion of health  equity , which compares 
different groups, primarily refers to this social dimension of  justice , although denial 
of access to health care, a contributing factor to  health inequity , violates what the 
individual is owed. 
 Respect for persons emphasizes that individuals, as agents in charge of their own 
lives and bodies, have the right to make decisions and choices free from undue 
interference.  Respect for persons forms the basis of  informed consent , namely, the 
right of patients and human  research subjects to be informed of, and to  assent to, 
medical or research procedures they might undergo, especially procedures that pose 
potential harm or  risk . Conducting research  on  human subjects or performing medi-
cal procedures on patients without their prior knowledge or  consent in most cases 
violates their  personal autonomy . However, health  professionals have a special (i.e., 
paternal)  obligation to look out for the welfare of people with diminished decisional 
capacity—such as those in a coma or the very young—and to protect them from 
harm. 
 These four  principles were originally conceived as  prima facie principles, that is, 
each expressed a self-evident though not absolutely binding  obligation and none 
had an inherent priority over another. However, in many  Western countries and in 
the  United States in particular,  respect for persons has dominated discussion in  bio-
ethics , clinical ethics, and  research ethics where it often takes precedence as a moral 
consideration over the other principles. This ascendancy most likely refl ects the 
high value that these countries place on  liberty and  freedom . At any rate, in public 
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discourse generally and in public debate about public  health interventions ,  respect 
for persons often amounts to an insistence on noninterference with individual free 
choice or with personal preferences. Although Kant’s other-regarding idea of moral 
 autonomy , harmonizes well with collective decision making, the insistence on non-
interference with personal  choice often creates impediments to the implementation 
of public  health interventions . In part for this reason, the  social justice movement 
has had to challenge the emphasis on respect for persons in order to  promote the 
public good and health  equity . 
1.4.2  Contrast between  Clinical Ethics and Public Health 
Ethics 
 Table  1.2 contrasts the individual focus of clinical ethics with the community/
 population focus of public health ethics. Because public health and clinical practice 
can overlap, the items in the respective columns represent tendencies along a con-
tinuum rather than stark opposites. Where separate agencies carry out  public health 
services and medical care, these contrasts may be more pronounced. The overlap 
between public health and clinical practice makes it even more important to high-
light their differences to bring out distinctive features of public health ethics.
 The table makes clear that the Belmont principles of  benefi cence (seeking ben-
efi ts),  nonmalefi cence (avoiding harm),  respect for persons , and  justice remain 
important in public health, but must be extended to accommodate the broader scope 
 Table 1.2  Comparison of areas of focus/tendency in  clinical ethics and public health ethics 
 Clinical ethics focus/tendency  Public health ethics focus/tendency 
 Treatment of disease and injury  Prevention of disease and injury 
 Medical interventions by clinical 
professionals 
 Range of interventions by various professionals 
 Individual benefi t seeking and harm 
avoidance based on health care provider’s 
fi duciary relation to a patient 
 Social, community, or  population benefi t 
seeking and harm avoidance based on collective 
action 
 Respect for individual patients  Relational  autonomy of interdependent citizens 
 Professional  duty to place the interests of the 
patient over that of provider 
 Duty to the community to address health 
concerns that individuals cannot solve and that 
require collective action 
 Authority based on the prestige and 
trustworthiness of the physician and the 
medical profession as a whole 
 Authority based on  law , which is a principal tool 
of  public health policy for creating health 
 regulations 
 Informed consent sought from an individual 
patient for specifi c medical interventions 
 Community  consent and building a  social 
consensus through ongoing dialogue and 
 collaboration with the public 
 Justice concerns largely limited to treating 
patients equally and ensuring  universal 
access to health care 
 Central concern with  social justice regarding 
health and achieving  health equity 
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of public  health interventions . This broader scope entails many types of  profession-
als , interventions and policies that display a  political and social dimension, and a 
wider range of activities such as community engagement,  intersectoral  collabora-
tion , collective decision making, and governmental administration. As a result, pre-
vailing political philosophies and culture will necessarily shape the way public 
health functions. The crucial point is that differences of scale that produce a higher 
order of complexity also produce qualitative differences that introduce different pat-
terns of causation. Among other things, this means that social factors do not merely 
represent aggregated individual factors and so cannot always be addressed in the 
same way as individual factors. 
1.4.3  Individual Versus Relational  Autonomy 
 For understanding what is qualitatively distinct about public health, the contrast 
between  respect for individual persons and the relational autonomy of community 
members is key.  Respect for persons upholds an individual’s right to make  indepen-
dent decisions free from undue pressure, but relational autonomy emphasizes that 
individual actions occur in the context of other people whom these actions will 
affect. The potential harmful impact of individual action on the welfare of others 
sets a limit to individual action. Relational autonomy draws attention, then, to the 
 interdependence of people living in communities and to the  solidarity that arises 
from the emotional bonds that shared lives create. Anthropology teaches that people 
always fi nd themselves in a network of social relations, while evolutionary biology 
has shown how profoundly people are built from the physiological ground up as 
sociopolitical beings. Because it presupposes the social context of language and 
reasoning ability, individual autonomy also depends developmentally on relational 
autonomy. That is, people only become autonomous through relations and interac-
tions with others. As African humanism (ubuntu philosophy) epitomizes it,  umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu , “a person is a person through other persons” (Louw  2008 ). 
Familial and communal deliberate processes are foundational for the development 
of individual autonomy and provide an even deeper basis for collective decisions 
than the type of solidarity that comes to the fore in crises or in the face of common 
predicaments. Kant would reject any suggestion that developmental context, emo-
tional bonds or feelings of solidarity underpin moral autonomy. Nevertheless, moral 
autonomy and relational autonomy both display an inner-directed, but other- oriented 
feature that readily aligns with collective decision making. 
 These points about the foundational character of social relatedness,  solidarity , 
 interdependence , and communal decision making do not readily align with certain 
features of  social contract theory , on whose  principles liberal democracy is based. 
Whereas virtually every other  political tradition conceives the sociopolitical realm 
as a natural feature of human life,  social contract theory posits humankind’s original 
state, the state of nature, as one of solitary  individualism . In this view, society or at 
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least civil society come into existence voluntarily through a contract that creates 
 government through the  consent of the governed (Riley  1982 ). Although never seri-
ously advanced as a scientifi c account of society’s origins, social contract theory 
nevertheless has exerted a powerful infl uence as a  political founding myth. As such, 
it has made personal  liberty , free choice, and consent of the governed presumptive 
 values of societies whose governing political philosophy rests on social contract 
theory. By “presumptive,” we mean that the value,  norm , or claim is assumed to be 
valid or have priority, so that the onus is on the person who objects to the presump-
tion to justify a different value, norm, or claim. 
1.4.4  Personal Autonomy as a  Presumptive Value of Liberal 
Democracy 
 Personal autonomy in a clinical and  research context generally means  respect for 
the patient’s right to receive an explanation of a medical procedure or research inter-
vention, to be informed of any potential benefi ts or harms, and to freely choose 
whether to accept the procedure or participate in the research. More generally and 
in other contexts, personal autonomy has come to mean an insistence on  liberty , free 
choice, and noninterference with personal preferences. Personal autonomy in this 
more general sense owes more to John Stuart  Mill’s nineteenth-century views on 
 liberty than to Kant’s eighteenth-century idea of autonomy (O’Neil  2002 ; Dawson 
 2011 ). An important aspect of Mill’s view of liberty is the “ harm principle ,” which 
holds that “the only purpose for which  power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” 
(Mill  1989 ) . What people choose to do regarding themselves is no business of  gov-
ernment . Interfering with this private sphere of self-determination constitutes gov-
ernmental  paternalism . This interference diminishes the sphere of  liberty that 
affords individuals the chance to direct their own lives and develop their talents and 
character to the highest degree. A chief advantage of democratic society, one that 
benefi ts the entire society, is the creative social dynamism that emerges from the 
synergism between individuals who are developing their talents and abilities. 
 Arguably, the primary aim of the  harm principle is to promote the kind of indi-
vidual self-development that benefi ts society rather than to champion every exercise 
of free choice. At any rate, some have sought to distinguish this edifying version of 
 personal autonomy from an all-encompassing version that demands undue defer-
ence to any and all personal  choices and preferences merely because they are per-
sonal (O’Neill  2002 ; Dawson  2011 ; Powers et al.  2012 ). Presuming, or insisting on, 
the validity of  personal autonomy makes more sense in the delimited context of 
medicine and  biomedical research on human subjects where an individual’s body is 
the focus of activity. It makes less sense in the far wider sphere of public health 
activity where social interactions and the  interdependence of people come into play. 
Absolutizing  personal autonomy in the sphere of public health would give effective 
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veto  power over every collective decision aimed at the public good to any individual 
who felt constrained by that decision. A more moderate version might distinguish 
levels of importance of personal choices and exercises of  liberty . A collective deci-
sion concerning the public good could override some personal choices and limit 
liberty, even when they did not involve direct harm to others. Such decisions, when 
made in the context of a fair, transparent process of ethical deliberation involving 
 stakeholders , are more likely to get buy-in from a community and less likely to be 
labeled  paternalistic . 
 Because public health considers the relation between individuals and the collec-
tive good, it necessarily has a  political dimension. How a country’s political culture 
balances this relation will drive and constrain public health practice and so shape the 
nature of the ethical frameworks that are appropriate to a country’s politics (Hyder 
et al.  2008 ). In the brief history of public health ethics, the most important  ethics 
frameworks have emerged in the political context of liberal democracy. Many of 
these frameworks refl ect the tensions between public health’s  obligation to act col-
lectively for the common good and the  presumptive value of  personal autonomy . 
The  principle of  least infringement and Kass’s  code of restraint illustrate the effort 
to mediate such tensions (Kass  2001 ). The code of restraint strives to balance  auton-
omy claims against the  obligation to safeguard  community health by determining 
what intervention most effectively protects health while minimally infringing on 
 liberty . In a liberal political context that recognizes Mill’s  harm principle , this strat-
egy justifi es the trumping of  personal autonomy as long as imminent harm threatens 
the populace, for example, in a deadly outbreak of contagious disease. But where 
the threat of harm to others is indirect or not immediate, as with the  obesity epi-
demic, the  harm principle less readily justifi es a liberty-limiting intervention such as 
banning or taxing certain foods. Utilitarian approaches that weigh the health advan-
tages of intervention and the disadvantages of obesity clearly support obesity inter-
vention, but limiting interventions to those that do not restrict personal  choices also 
have limited  effectiveness . In Chap.  6 , Jennings considers the relative merits of 
these approaches in his overview of the ethical issues in environmental and occupa-
tional public health. His discussion raises the question of the extent to which an 
ethical framework should adapt itself to the presumptive  values of the  political con-
text or should refl ect the nature of the practical fi eld under investigation. To some 
extent, it must do both. 
 The three-step framework offered in the next section is designed to guide deci-
sion makers, through questions, to assess the ethical dimensions of a case, including 
which moral considerations (e.g.,  population utility or  liberty ) may have more 
weight than others, given the issue or context. This contextual approach provides 
the fl exibility and starting point for deliberation to accommodate the issues globally 
and to uncover the varying perspectives of  stakeholders with potentially different 
presumptive moral  norms (e.g.,  solidarity versus  individual rights ). 
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1.5  Ethical Frameworks 
 What at fi rst glance demarcates public health ethics from related fi elds of health 
ethics are the ethical problems that public health  professionals typically encounter 
in their practice and the ethical frameworks used in practice to address these prob-
lems. Regarding these ethical problems, this casebook offers a representative, but 
not exhaustive, sample. Regarding ethical frameworks, this chapter has suggested 
two competing criteria for choosing. On the one hand, ethical frameworks should be 
grounded in their topics. Dawson ( 2011 ) expresses the point succinctly by arguing 
that public health should be the foundation of public health ethics. Accordingly, we 
have presented a view of public health ethics that builds on the defi nitions of public, 
health, and public health, and on the goals of public health practice. But we have 
also defi ned ethics and indicated how public health ethics draws on numerous ethical 
theories and can provide a moral guide grounded in the  norms of benefi ting others, 
preventing harms, and providing utility. We have pointed out its distinguishing 
 principles based on the facts of community and  interdependence . Lastly, we have 
situated public health ethics within the process of ethical decision making about 
which options are the most justifi able means to achieve public health goals in a 
particular context. In the end, grounding public health ethics in public health may 
require public health leaders to have the courage to advocate public health  values 
and goals, even when that position is unpopular. Such a stance may be justifi ed, for 
example, where the feasibility of a much-needed public  health intervention requires 
a long- range strategy to change social  norms or build  social consensus . 
 On the other hand, precisely because public health itself is practical, pragmatic, 
and community oriented, an ethical framework designed for it must accommodate 
itself to a country’s  presumptive values and  political culture. This consideration 
illustrates that the feasibility of public  health interventions usually depends on their 
alignment with the political culture, while their success usually implies public 
acceptance. Many established frameworks, like that of Kass, seem designed with a 
liberal political context in mind that gives presumptive weight to  individual liberty , 
which may limit the range of interventions that can be justifi ed. Newer approaches 
to ethical analysis in public health place more emphasis on social values like  equity 
and  solidarity , although these newer approaches often are diffi cult to put into practice 
(Lee  2012 ). In addition, while newer approaches may offer clear reasons to justify 
a broader range of interventions, the reasons may be less persuasive if they do not 
consider the presumptive  values in context. For example, in Chap.  3 , Daniels dis-
cusses the ethical  confl icts that arise during  pandemics between the  standard goal of 
improving  population health and emergency contexts that demand allocating scarce 
resources in a way that treats people fairly. He asks, if in the pandemic context we 
believe that saving the most lives trumps giving priority to those who are sickest, 
can we justify revising the usual priority given to the sickest in health care? 
 Arguably, what would be most useful is not a set of frameworks designed for 
specifi c presumptive  values , but, rather, a framework that can accommodate any 
presumptive values and consider them in relation to values rooted in public health 
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or in context. The three-step framework that follows is a straightforward tool to help 
practitioners analyze the ethical tensions in a particular context. It addresses 
Daniels’ tough question directly by considering health care’s presumptive prioriti-
zation of the sickest in relation to the public health value of saving the most lives in 
a  pandemic . 
1.6  A Three-Step Approach to Public Health Decision 
Making 
 We offer the following framework, drawn from public health practice and described 
by Bernheim et al. ( 2007 ), as an example of an analytic tool that can guide decision 
makers through reasoning and deliberation. It is not meant to introduce a rigid 
application of ethical principles, nor does it presume that any one moral  norm has 
greater weight that trumps other norms. Instead, the questions are designed to help 
decision makers clarify whether a particular moral norm (e.g.,  solidarity or  liberty 
or  equity ) is weightier than others in context, and if so, then strong reasons must be 
offered to override the presumptive moral  norm . For example, during an epidemic, 
equity may carry presumptive weight and trump other moral  norms in some con-
texts. Ethicists at the Joint Centre for  Bioethics offered the following insight from 
the SARS experience:
 In the case of an epidemic, it is important to control the spread of the disease, but as much 
attention should be paid to the rights of the noninfected patients who need urgent medical 
care. There may be as many people who died from other illnesses and could not get into 
hospital as there were who died from SARS.  Equity is required in the amount of attention 
given to a wide array of people, including patients with and without SARS. Accountability 
for making  reasonable decisions, transparency and  fairness are expected …. (Singer et al. 
 2003 ) 
 The questions clarify the relevant factors, such as stakeholder claims, alternative 
actions, and possible justifi cations for deciding on one course of action. 
1.6.1  An Approach to Ethical Analysis and Justifi cation 
in Context 
 Step I: Analyze the Ethical Dimensions of the Public Health Issue and Context
•  What are the  risks , harms, or concerns? 
•  What are the appropriate public health goals in this context? 
•  What is the scope and legitimacy of legal authority, and which  laws and  regu-
lations apply? 
•  What are the moral  norms and claims of  stakeholders , and how strong are 
they? 
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•  Are  precedent legal or ethical cases relevant for identifying the presumptive 
moral  norms ? 
•  Which features of the social-cultural-historical context apply? 
•  Do professional codes of ethics provide guidance? 
 Step II: Formulate Alternative Courses of Action and Evaluate their Ethical 
Dimensions
•  What are the short- and long-term options, given the assessment of the public 
health issue and context in Step I? 
•  What are the ethical dimensions and tensions of each option?
 –  Utility: Does the public health action produce the best balance of benefi ts 
over harms and other  costs ? 
 –  Equity and  Justice : Is  health equity advanced? Are the benefi ts and bur-
dens distributed fairly ( distributive justice )? Is there appropriate public 
 participation , including the participation of affected parties ( procedural 
justice )? 
 –  Respect for Individual and Community Interests: Does the public health 
action respect  self-determination and  human rights , as well as civic roles 
and community values (e.g., trustworthiness,  solidarity ) (Dawson and 
Jennings  2012 )? 
•  Other Moral Considerations in Public Health: Are there other moral consider-
ations in public health that are important to consider? (For example, reciproc-
ity, solidarity, protecting  privacy and confi dentiality; keeping promises and 
commitments; or disclosing  information and speaking honestly, sometimes 
grouped as transparency.) 
 Step III: Provide Justifi cation for a Particular Public Health Decision
•  Effectiveness : Is the public health action likely to be effective? 
•  Proportionality : Will the probable benefi ts of the action outweigh the infringed 
moral considerations? 
•  Necessity: Is the action necessary (i.e., will overriding a confl icting ethical 
 norm achieve an important public health goal)? 
•  Least Infringement : Is the public health action the least restrictive means 
available? 
•  Public Justifi cation: Can decision makers offer public justifi cation in the 
 political and cultural context that  stakeholders , the public, and those most 
affected fi nd acceptable? 
 Consider the following scenario described by Melnick ( 2015a ). A family adopted 
several  children from a developing country with a high  tuberculosis (TB) preva-
lence, including  multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) .  Screening on arrival revealed 
that the children were infected with TB but did not have active disease and were not 
contagious. The family has strong religious beliefs about medical care and refused 
 treatment , immunizations, and other preventive care. The children were home- 
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schooled, but they did attend community activities. Soon after arrival one of the 
teenage children developed TB symptoms, and after several months the family con-
sulted a pediatrician who diagnosed active pulmonary TB. Cultures revealed that 
the child had MDR-TB. Directly observed treatment (DOT) is part of the  standard 
of care for active TB in the  United States , and the local health department nurse 
visited the family to provide DOT. The  parents objected to the home visit, stating 
that DOT was an invasion of their  privacy and parental rights. The health depart-
ment has the statutory authority to require in-person DOT and even impose isolation 
of the case and removal from the family to protect the public’s health. What should 
health offi cials do? Drawing on questions in Step I, health offi cials might fi rst clar-
ify the harms and  risks and the goals of public health action. The public health goals 
are to prevent TB transmission and ensure the child receives appropriate care. 
Requiring DOT creates risks for the child such as side effects from treatment and 
social and behavioral harms associated with isolation and loss of  privacy during 
visits, and potential community harm, by driving cases underground. Who are the 
 stakeholders , and what are their moral claims?
 There are several stakeholders: the child, the child’s family (including  parents but also sev-
eral siblings), and the public, which expects the health department to protect the community 
from TB. Regarding moral claims, the child has some expectations of  freedom of move-
ment, and  privacy ; the family has similar expectations regarding privacy,  respect for paren-
tal rights, and the  freedom to administer  medications to their child at a convenient time and 
place. However, these claims are not absolute, and competing moral claims can outweigh 
them. The child has a moral claim that could compete with her parent’s claim, specifi cally, 
that receiving DOT will reduce the  risk of inappropriate  treatment and relapse compared to 
having her  parents administer the medications. In addition, the public has a moral claim 
based on two expectations: ( 1 ) that the health department will protect the community from 
TB, and ( 2 ) that people contagious for TB and other  infectious diseases will protect others 
by behaving in an appropriate manner, including staying home when  contagious and coop-
erating with treatment recommendations. This is especially concerning in this case because 
the  immigration health offi cials had discussed the risks with the parents, warning them to 
seek treatment as soon as the child developed symptoms, yet the parents waited several 
months before taking the child to a pediatrician (Melnick  2015a , 175). 
 Consider another short scenario that illustrates the value of exploring options 
under Step II. A new  policy is being considered that would require  parental consent 
for newborn  screening .  Parental consent currently is not required, although newborn 
testing is not conducted if there are parental objections. The health department has 
been asked to take a position on the pending policy. What position should the health 
department take? What are the options? 
 Options include mandatory  screening without  consent , routine screening with 
advance notifi cation (Opt In), routine screening without advance notifi cation (Opt Out) 
(i.e., screening and testing done unless the  parents object),  voluntary screening (i.e., 
screening requires full consent and might also include a pre- and post- counseling 
session with each new mother). Some arguments that might be offered against 
requiring  parental consent focus on the fact that (1) the benefi ts of screening are 
obvious and substantial, relative to potential harms; (2)  parents have few good rea-
sons to justify parental refusal and place their child at  risk for harm; (3) obtaining 
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consent from each parent is diffi cult, costly, and an unwarranted expenditure of time 
and money; and (4) the history of  newborn screening has become acceptable and 
routine. Some arguments that may be raised for requiring  parental consent include 
(1) parental consent is necessary because refusal of newborn  screening is reasonable 
given the increasing list of diseases included in the battery of newborn tests and the 
low probability of many of these diseases; (2)  newborn screening can have adverse 
consequences such as psychological harms associated with false positive tests; (3) 
long-term parental caretaking is enhanced when parents are included in all clinical 
decisions about their  children ; and (4) the process of obtaining  consent need not be 
time-consuming or burdensome but rather can help enhance the health professional- 
patient relationship (CDC  2012 ) . Which arguments are stronger, and which of the 
options are the most ethically justifi able? The answer may depend on the social and 
 political context in which the issue is considered, and which ethical  values carry 
weight in that context. Whether there were  presumptive values in place would be 
explored through the questions in Step I, which examines previous cases, the appli-
cable  laws and policies, and  stakeholder claims in context. So, for example, in a 
society that has a strong moral  norm or presumption for  solidarity , there could be a 
presumption for continuing  population newborn  screening without  parental con-
sent . On the other hand, for a society that has a liberal political context that has a 
presumption for  individual liberty , there may be a presumption for an option that 
seeks more explicit  consent from  parents . In either context, the presumptive moral 
 norms are not determinative but are rebuttable, so the arguments or reasons to over-
ride those norms must be stronger. 
 Consider a third case from public health practice in which a person (the index 
case) infected with primary  syphilis and  HIV refuses to provide contact  information 
for his wife, insisting that he and his wife had not had sexual relations for several 
years. Contact tracing and partner notifi cation have been important tools historically 
for public health offi cials, although these interventions can involve thorny ethical 
tensions, requiring health offi cials to justify their decisions. In this type of situation, 
health offi cers will consider several options, starting with those that infringe least on 
the index case’s choices. For example, they might fi rst provide to the index case 
additional  information and assurance about confi dentiality while allowing him to 
notify his wife voluntarily, either alone or with the help of public health workers. If 
this proves unsuccessful, other interventions might be considered, such as incen-
tives, the threat of restrictions such as isolation, or attempts to notify the wife with-
out his knowledge or  consent . Each of these options would be determined in context, 
using the questions in Step III. Questions considered may include (1) Would the 
options likely accomplish the goal of warning and testing the wife without risking 
greater harm or possible adverse outcomes for the wife (e.g., domestic violence, 
loss of income, or loss of housing)? (2) Is there signifi cant concern about a  risk of 
harm to others, such as family members or  children , so that the burdens and benefi ts 
of the action would not be distributed fairly? (3) Is the action the least restrictive of 
the important moral claims of the  stakeholders ? (4) Is it necessary now to override 
 confl icting claims to achieve the public health goal? Answering the questions in 
Step III helps decision makers consider whether actions are justifi able. As one 
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health offi cer explains, “Public health offi cials should justify their decisions with 
deliberations that build not only community support and  trust , but also build support 
and trust from the individuals and families directly affected” (Melnick  2015b ). 
 As the scenarios illustrate, public health is a social and  political undertaking. 
Thus, making diffi cult choices in public health implicates important social, cultural, 
and political  norms embedded in a particular context and community of  stakehold-
ers (Childress and Bernheim  2008 ). Regardless of whether decision makers work in 
a  government public health agency, community nonprofi t,  nongovernmental organi-
zation (NGO) from another country, or a global organization, decision makers must 
rigorously assess the public health issue  in context , to minimally be able to act “in 
ways that preserve the moral foundations of social collaboration” at the core of  col-
lective health activity (Calabresi and Bobbitt  1978 ). 
 The context specifi cally includes attention to  stakeholders and relationships 
among public health stakeholders and community members, including the common 
understanding of their roles,  obligations , and  collaborations . Especially in  global 
public health , it is important to note that even the decision makers are stakeholders, 
in some sense, and often, when they are health  professionals , they have their own 
social-cultural norms and their own professional codes that can provide guidance. 
Appeals to the codes of particular professions, however, do not provide a suffi cient 
justifi cation for a public health decision, since justifi cations should be grounded in 
a society’s widely shared ethical values and  norms . 
 Engaging stakeholders and addressing claims, especially those of the people 
most affected by a public health issue, in ethical analysis, is especially important 
and can sometimes support and strengthen the  collaboration and cohesion needed 
for public acceptance of a decision. The ways to engage and reason with  stakehold-
ers in an ethical analysis will vary in different settings and communities, depending 
on community  values , cohesion, and expectations, and can range from establishing 
an ethics board for deliberation, to gathering  information from focus groups or 
social media, to including stakeholder representatives on the decision-making team. 
 Stakeholder  norms and claims are a critical feature for an ethical analysis in order 
to achieve a primary goal in public health—the development and maintenance of 
relationships of  trust , defi ned in a report from IOM as “the belief that those with 
whom one interacts will take one’s interests into account, even in situations in which 
one is not in a position to recognize, evaluate, or thwart a potentially negative course 
of action by those trusted” (IOM  1996 ). 
 Ethical analysis is a dynamic process and, particularly for the practice of public 
health, is best accomplished through group deliberations that involve understanding 
others’ perspectives and thinking independently and imaginatively. Public health 
 professionals often have to decide how best to realize numerous important societal 
 norms and  values when pursuing public health goals. Ethical tensions do occur in 
public health and at times require overriding an important  principle , value, or moral 
consideration to undertake a justifi able public health action. However, a structured 
ethical analysis can often lead to imaginative alternatives that transcend or mini-
mize ethical tensions and to decisions that most or many stakeholders fi nd 
acceptable. 
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